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Articles
IS UNITED STATES CORPORATE TAX POLICY OUTSOURCING
AMERICA? A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE PROPOSED TAX
HOLIDAY FOR TRAPPED CFC EARNINGS
ROBERT BLOINK
I. INTRODUCTION
T HE debate about how best to reform U.S corporate tax policy hasfocused almost exclusively on making U.S. corporations more com-
petitive globally.' But the debate often glosses over tax policy's effect on
the ultimate beneficiaries of corporate success and failure-U.S. corporate
stakeholders. The assumption often has been that healthy, competitive
U.S. corporations equal healthy stakeholders-including shareholders,
employees, and the U.S. populace as a whole. However, recent economic
research has brought the assumption of "trickle down" success into
question.2
Economists examining the United States' comparative advantage in
relation to its international trading partners suggest that making U.S. mul-
tinationals more competitive globally does not necessarily translate into a
net increase in domestic investments in plants, property, and equipment
or American jobs.3
1. SeeJohn D. McKinnon, Business Group Backs Overhaul of Tax Code, WALL ST.
J., Jan. 21, 2011, at A5, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB00014240527
48704881304576094311480595224.html (discussing necessity of overhauling U.S.
tax code and difficulties associated with it); see also JASON J. FICHTNER, JOINT ECON.
COMM., REFORMING THE U.S. CORPORATE TAx SYSTEM TO INCREASE TAX COMPETI-
TIVENEss 1 (2005), available at http://www.house.gov/jec/CorporateTaxReform.
pdf ("The existing U.S. corporate tax laws have grown into a patchwork of overly
complex, inefficient and unfair provisions that impose large costs on corporate
business. U.S. corporations seeking to minimize the costs imposed by the counter-
productive provisions in the U.S. corporate tax system have adopted strategies to
reduce overall tax exposure and increase profits. Such strategies include moving
operations overseas, corporate inversions, transfer pricing, earnings stripping, and
complex leasing arrangements, all to minimize taxation.").
The Committee's report acknowledges that "[c]orporations are not people.
They are legal entities involving employees, shareholders, creditors, etc., each with
their own individual wealth and income characteristics." Id. at 2. However, it does
not specify how recommended changes to U.S. corporate tax policy would affect
corporate stakeholders like shareholders and employees.
2. See Kamel Mellahi & Geoffrey Wood, The Role and Potential of Stakeholders in
"Hollow Participation": Conventional Stakeholder Theory and Institutionalist Alternatives,
108 Bus. & Soc'v REv. 183, 192 (2003) (citing sweatshop model as evidence of
decline in trickle down success).
3. See KIMBERLY C[AUSING, International Taxation, in TAX POLICY CTR., THE TAX
POLICY BRIEFING BOOIC A CITIZENS' GUIDE FOR THE 2008 ELECTION AND BEYOND, at
(833)
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The disconnect between stakeholder interests and corporate competi-
tiveness is nowhere more evident than in the area of United States interna-
tional tax policy-which tends to incentivize U.S. multinationals to sock
profits away overseas rather than repatriating them into the United
States.4 The controlled foreign corporations (CFC) regime, in particular,
creates a tax disincentive for U.S. multinationals to reinvest in domestic
operations.5
Congress acknowledged the disincentive to repatriation created by
U.S. tax policy, enacting a tax holiday in 2004 that many believed would
motivate multinational corporations (MNCs) to repatriate billions in over-
seas profits into the United States, providing a needed bump to the U.S.
economy.6 But tax breaks like the 2004 holiday cost the federal govern-
ment billions in revenue and prove to be only a blunt policy tool having
only a limited impact on domestic stakeholders of U.S. multinationals.
Similarly, other proposals-like slashing the U.S. corporate tax rate or
transitioning to a territorial system of corporate taxation-would drasti-
cally reduce the amount of U.S. taxes collected from multinationals and
have a dubious positive impact on corporate stakeholders.'
This Article suggests an alternate path focused on enhancing the
competitiveness of U.S. MNCs in the global economy while enhancing the
welfare of U.S. corporate stakeholders. The Article concludes by sug-
gesting an incremental reform to the current Subpart F regime that would
allow U.S. MNCs to repatriate assets currently trapped in CFCs at a low tax
cost in exchange for targeted domestic re-investment commitments. This
normative solution would have a substantially lower net federal budgetary
cost to implement than other proposals currently circulating.
II. PERMANENT DEFERRAL AND SUBPART F
The United States taxes all U.S. persons, including both individuals
and business entities incorporated in the United States, on their world-
wide income "from whatever source derived."8 A U.S. corporation, for in-
11-15-1, 15-8 (2007), available at http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/upload/Ele-
ments/II-15KEYELEMENTS-InternationalTaxation.final.pdf (examining impact of
tax system on U.S. competitiveness).
4. See id. at 11-15-5 (examining consequences of U.S. international tax system).
5. See OFFICE OF TAX POLICY, U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, THE DEFERRAL OF IN-
COME EARNED THROUGH U.S. CONTROLLED FOREIGN CORPORATIONS: A POLICY
STUDY, at xii (2000), available at http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-pol-
icy/Documents/subpartf.pdf (discussing CFCs).
6. See CHUCK MARR & BIUAN HIGHSMITH, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL'Y PRIORITIES,
TAx HOLIDAY FOR OVERSEAS CORPORATE PROFITS WOULD INCREASE DEFICITS, FAIL TO
BOOST THE ECONOMY, AND ULTIMATELY SHwir MORE INVESTMENT AND JOBS OVERSEAS
2 (2011), available at http://www.cbpp.org/files/4-8-1ltax.pdf (discussing failure
of 2004 tax holiday and danger of enacting another tax holiday).
7. See Michael J. Graetz & Michael M. O'Hear, The "Original Intent" of U.S.
International Taxation, 46 DUKE L.J. 1021, 1026-27 (1997) (discussing U.S. system of
taxation for international income).
8. I.R.C. § 61(a) (2006).
834 [Vol. 56: p. 833
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stance, that owns both a U.S. manufacturer and a French manufacturer
will be taxed on its U.S. and its French income. In contrast to the U.S.
system, some of our trading partners (e.g., Hong Kong and Singapore)
use a pure territorial system of taxation, under which individuals and com-
panies based in the jurisdiction are taxed only on income earned in the
jurisdiction; there is no tax on foreign-sourced income.
A. Capital Export Neutrality and Capital Import Neutrality
The U.S. system of international taxation was adopted with the goal of
maintaining capital export neutrality (CEN). Under CEN, a company's
earnings-whether earned domestically or abroad-are taxed at the same
rate, with a credit for foreign taxes paid.9 One of the goals of the United
States in generally adopting the principle of CEN was to "maximize global
economic welfare"1 0 by ensuring that U.S. taxation does not incentivize
taxpayers to invest their income in domestic or foreign investments. 1
In contrast to the principle of CEN, under the economic principle of
capital import neutrality (CIN), MNCs and foreign companies that oper-
ate in the same market are taxed at the same rates.' 2 The idea behind
CIN is that all investments in ajurisdiction are subject to the same tax rate
regardless of where the taxpayer resides.1 3 Under a system using the prin-
9. See OFFICE OF TAx POLICY, supra note 5, at 17 n.21 (noting Kennedy Admin-
istration's focus on capital export neutrality); ROBERT J. SHAPIRO & APARNA
MATHUR, THE EcoNoMic BENEFITS OF PROVISIONS ALLOWING U.S. MULTINATIONAL
COMPANIES To DEFER U.S. CORPORATE TAX ON THEIR FOREIGN EARNINGS AND THE
COSTS TO THE U.S. ECONOMr OF REPEALING DEFERRAL 8 (2009), available at http://
www.sonecon.com/docs/studies/Shapiro-Mathurjune_2009_EconomicBenefits
of Deferral.pdf (defining international tax systems as either worldwide or territo-
rial); Kristen Fullenkamp, International Tax Reform: Oscillating Between Capital Import
and Capital Export Neutrality, 2 PULSE, no. 3, (2005), available at http://www.baylor.
edu/Pulse/index.php?id=27753 (describing philosophy underlying CEN and
CIN); Michael J. Graetz, Taxing International Income: Inadequate Principles, Outdated
Concepts, and Unsatisfactory Policies, 26 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 1357, 1363-65 (2001) (de-
fining capital export neutrality).
10. OFFICE OF TAX POLICY, supra note 5, at 36; see RobertJ. Peroni, Deferral of
U.S. Tax on International Income: End It, Don't Mend It-Why Should We Be Stuck in the
Middle with Subpart F?, 79 TEx. L. REV. 1609,1609 n.5 (2001) ("'[T]he literature on
optimal taxation of foreign direct investment income suggests that, when the goal
is to maximize global economic welfare, capital export neutrality is probably the
best policy.'" (quoting OFFICE OF TAX POLICY, supra note 5, at 36)).
11. OFFICE OF TAx POLICY, supra, note 5, at 23 (discussing system for taxing
foreign investment).
12. See SHAPIRO & MATHUR, supra note 9, at 8 (contrasting CEN and CIN in
context of foreign tax equality structures); Fullenkamp, supra note 10 (discussing
U.S. stance on international taxation in section entitled "Underlying
Philosophies").
13. See OFFICE OF TAX POLICY, supra note 5, at 31 (detailing Thomas Horst's
criticism of standard analysis); Michael S. Knoll, Reconsidering International Tax Neu-
trality 3 (Univ. of Pa. Inst. for Law & Econ., Research Paper Series No. 09-16, 2009),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1407198 (argu-
ing for more precise definition of CIN).
835
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ciple of CIN, if a company earned foreign income, that income would not
be taxed at domestic rates; rather, it would be taxed at foreign rates.14
CIN takes shape in the territorial system of taxation, where taxation de-
pends on the source of the income.1 5
B. World Wide Taxation, and Exceptions Thereto
To an extent, CEN takes shape in the U.S. system of international
taxation, but most countries do not have either a pure worldwide tax sys-
tem or a pure territorial tax system; the majority of countries-including
the United States-use a system combining elements of both.' 6
The United States has the authority to tax U.S. individuals on their
worldwide income; as a result, U.S. residents-both individual and corpo-
rate-can be taxed regardless of where they are located.17 The United
States uses a "current taxation of worldwide income" method, under
which U.S. residents are taxed on foreign-source income when earned.' 8
But the United States gives U.S. taxpayers a foreign tax credit to pre-
vent double-taxation-meaning foreign-source income is not taxed do-
mestically if it has already been taxed abroad.' 9
C. United States Taxation of Branches and Subsidiaries of U.S. Corporations
Under the worldwide taxation system, a U.S. corporation is required
to include all income and losses from foreign branches in its taxable in-
come. 20 In contrast, income earned by foreign subsidiaries of U.S. corpo-
rations generally is not taxed by the United States until that income is sent
back to the U.S. parent company via a distribution.2' This allows those
14. See OFFICE OF TAX POLICY, supra note 5, at 119 (discussing Kennedy Ad-
ministration's conception of tax neutrality systems); Knoll, supra note 13, at 5-6
(defining CIN by describing tax relationship between United States and European
Union).
15. See Fullenkamp, supra note 9 (discussing underlying philosophies of U.S.
international tax system stance).
16. See OFFICE OF TAX POLICY, supra note 5, at xi (noting few countries utilize
either pure worldwide or pure territorial taxation); see also Patrick Rush & Michael
Mincieli, Are U.S. Taxes Causing a Global Disadvantage?, FIN. EXEC.,June 2010, at 34,
available at http://www.financialexecutives.org/KenticoCMS/Financial-Executive-
Magazine/201006/Cover-Story-June-2010.aspx (discussing use of worldwide and
territorial tax systems in foreign countries).
17. See Keith Engel, Tax Neutrality to the Left, International Competitiveness to the
Right, Stuck in the Middle with Subpart F, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1525, 1529 (2001) (discuss-
ing jurisdiction of taxation by United States).
18. See OFFICE OF TAX POLICY, supra note 5, at x-xi (describing "current taxa-
tion of worldwide income" method of taxation).
19. See Diane M. Ring, Risk-Shifting Within a Multinational Corporation: The Inco-
herence of the U.S. Tax Regime, 38 B.C. L. REv. 667, 667-70 (1997) (discussing foreign
tax credits for U.S. taxpayers).
20. See Engel, supra note 17, at 1529 (discussing jurisdiction of U.S. taxation).
21. See id. at 1530 ("Due to international jurisdictional limitations, the United
States lacks the power to tax a foreign corporation on its foreign income, even if its
stock is completely owned by one or more U.S. persons. The United States instead
836 [Vol. 56: p. 833
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corporations to defer U.S. tax on income of foreign subsidiaries until the
U.S. parent elects to repatriate the income.2 2 U.S. tax on multinationals'
foreign income can be deferred indefinitely if the income is permanently
reinvested in a foreign country. 23 Like the foreign tax credit, the option
of permanent deferral of foreign income gives the U.S. international tax
system some of the elements of a territorial system. 2 4
D. The Need for Subpart F
From the inception of the Internal Revenue Code, domestic taxpayers
who wanted to invest abroad have had the option of investing through
either a foreign branch or a foreign subsidiary.25 From 1913 to 1937, the
United States did not tax U.S. parent companies on their foreign subsidi-
aries' income.2 6 Income of foreign subsidiaries was taxed only when it was
repatriated back into the United States.2 7
As a result, U.S. persons could form tax-haven subsidiaries that held
passive investments like stocks and bonds and avoid U.S. tax on income
taxes the income of a foreign subsidiary only when it actually repatriates, or is
deemed to repatriate, its profits to the United States (this delayed method of taxa-
tion is known as 'deferral')." (footnote omitted)).
22. See SHAPIRO & MATHUR, supra note 9, at 9 (discussing hybrid nature of tax
system and noting "U.S. companies are not liable for U.S. tax on all of most of
their foreign-source earnings until they receive those earnings through some form
of distribution"); Seth Hanlon, Tax Expenditure of the Week: Offshore Tax Deferral,
CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Mar. 16, 2011), http://www.americanprogress.org/is-
sues/2011/03/te_031611.html (describing U.S. tax system and noting there is no
federal income tax on multinational income as long as company keeps profits
offshore).
23. See OFFICE OF TAX POLIcY, supra note 5, at x (discussing tax avoidance by
long-term foreign investment without repatriation and potential for return of for-
eign investment to outstrip deferred tax liability); Tax Accounting Considerations of
Obama Administration's International Tax Proposals, U.S. TAX ALERT (Deloitte LLP),
June 10, 2009, at 3, available at http://www.deloitte.com/assets/Dcom-United
States/Local%20Assets/Documents/us-tax_alert061009.pdf (discussing indefinite
avoidance of tax liability by overseas reinvestment of foreign income).
24. See SHAPIRO & MATHUR, supra note 9, at 9 (noting impact of deferral provi-
sions in creating hybrid of strict worldwide and territorial tax regimes); WTO's Ex-
traterritorial Income Decision: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 107th
Cong. 67-68 (2002) (statement of Stephen E. Shay, Partner, Ropes & Gray LLP),
available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-107hhrg79971/pdf/CHRG-107
hhrg79971.pdf (discussing permanent deferral in section of prepared statement
entitled "Reform of the Current U.S. Tax System of Worldwide Taxation with
Deferral").
25. See Engel, supra note 17, at 1532 (discussing availability of foreign branch
and foreign subsidiary investment options).
26. See id. at 1527, 1533-34, 1533 n.26 (noting assessment of tax on foreign
subsidiaries under 1913 regime only when income was repatriated to United States
until anti-avoidance measures were adopted with Foreign Personal Holding Com-
pany regime under Revenue Act of 1937).
27. See Revenue Act of 1921, Pub. L. No. 67-98, § 238(a), 42 Stat. 227, 258
("[I] n the case of a domestic corporation the tax imposed by this title ... shall be
credited with the amount of any income . .. and excess-profits taxes paid during
the same taxable year to any foreign country . . ).
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from those investments.2 8 But in 1937, Congress stepped in and imposed
the Foreign Personal Holding Company (FPHC) regime under which the
income of foreign subsidiaries of U.S. persons was taxed to those persons
directly-as if their foreign subsidiaries did not exist.29
The FPHC rules were severely limited in application. A foreign sub-
sidiary was classified as a FPHC only if: (1) it was owned, directly or indi-
rectly, by five or fewer U.S. individuals, and (2) at least sixty percent of the
subsidiary's foreign gross income came from certain passive investments. 3 0
By definition, then, the FPHC rules did not apply to U.S. public compa-
nies, but only the smallest closely held companies.
In the 1960s, the U.S. economy was declining; it had a growing deficit
that many experts attributed to the U.S. international tax policy that per-
mitted MNCs to invest in foreign subsidiaries without U.S. tax liability.3'
Believing it needed to stop domestic companies from sidestepping U.S.
taxes by moving their income to foreign tax havens, Congress moved to
modernize the U.S. international tax regime. 32 Anti-deferral regimes were
borne from the need to stop corporations from bypassing the U.S. tax
rules.
28. See MICHAEL MAZEROV, CTR. ON BUDGET AND POL'Y PRIORITIES, STATE COR-
PoRATE TAx SHELTERS AND THE NEED FOR "COMBINED REPORTING" 2 (2007), availa-
ble at http://www.cbpp.org/files/ 10-26-07sfp.pdf (discussing mechanics of shifting
taxable profits to tax haven subsidiaries for tax avoidance); OFFICE OF TAX POLIcy,
supra note 5, at xii (discussing avoidance of profit shifting to tax-haven domiciled
subsidiaries as impetus for Subpart F regime); see also Engel, supra note 17, at 1532-
33 (discussing historic use of foreign subsidiaries as "incorporated pocketbooks" to
hold income-producing assets beyond reach of U.S. tax regime).
29. See OFFICE OF TAX POLICY, supra note 5, at 107-09 (discussing passage of
Foreign Personal Holding Company Act and statement by President Roosevelt that
Joint Committee's 1937 Report "'reveals efforts at avoidance and evasion of tax
liability so widespread and so amazing both in their boldness and their ingenuity
that further action without delay seems imperative'" (citation omitted)).
30. See id. at 7 ("Pursuant to the recommendation of the Joint Committee, the
U.S. shareholders were required to take into income, on a current basis, their pro
rata share of the undistributed net income of the foreign personal holding
company.").
31. See 145 CONG. REc. 3985, 4025 (1999) (discussing development of tax pol-
icy regarding CFCs and acceptance of deferral of tax on foreign-earned income);
Engel, supra note 26, at 1538 (discussing changes in political and economic cli-
mate leading to view of foreign subsidiary investment as leading to or exacerbating
growing deficit).
32. See OFFICE OF TAx POLIcY, supra note 5, at 23 (noting need for Subpart F
to prevent companies from shifting income to foreign tax-haven countries from
non-tax-haven countries like United States). See generally Michael S. Kirsch, The
Congressional Response to Corporate Expatriations: The Tension Between Symbols and Sub-
stance in the Taxation of Multinational Corporations, 24 VA. TAx REv. 475 (2005) (dis-
cussing need for anti-deferral regimes to prevent deferral of U.S. taxation through
use of foreign subsidiaries).
33. See OFnIcE OF TAX POLICY, supra note 5, at 3 (noting uniformity of taxation
across national sources of income removes incentive for foreign investment);
Kirsch, supra note 32 (discussing need for anti-deferral regimes to lessen ability of
domestic corporations to defer U.S. tax liability on foreign income through for-
eign subsidiaries).
838 [Vol. 56: p. 833
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Prior to settling on the Subpart F regime, the Kennedy Administra-
tion initially proposed a system of international taxation that closely ap-
proximated a pure worldwide system.3 4 The Administration proposed to
end all tax deferral for U.S. corporate investments in low-tax developed
countries like Switzerland and to restrict deferral for investments in low-
tax jurisdictions-so-called tax havens.3 5 The Republican-controlled Con-
gress favored a territorial system that would have taxed U.S.-based corpora-
tions on only their U.S.-sourced earnings. 3 6
Congress split the Kennedy Administration's proposal, implementing
only the second part. The Administration's initial proposal to completely
eliminate deferral for foreign subsidiaries operating within economically
developed countries did not pass,3 7 and a more generalized approach was
adopted. This anti-deferral approach, or the Subpart F regime, was en-
acted in 196238 to prevent domestic taxpayers from receiving tax-deferral
on passive income earned through offshore subsidiaries located in tax
havens.s 9 The Subpart F regime was only one of many anti-deferral re-
gimes passed that year.40
Subpart F is an exception to the general rules permitting permanent
deferral of tax on income earned by foreign subsidiaries of a U.S. corpora-
34. See Cynthia Ram Sweitzer, Analyzing Subpart F in Light of Check-the-Box, 20
AKRON TAxJ. 1, 1 (2005) (discussing Kennedy's approach to prevent "further ero-
sion of the [U.S.] tax base" by taxing all foreign and domestic income sources).
35. See OFFICE OF TAX POLICY, supra note 5, at 9 (" [T] he main thrust of the tax
avoidance techniques which led to the enactment of subpart F was the 'deflection'
of income to low-tax jurisdictions, not only from the United States, but also from
foreign high-tax developed countries where the principal value-adding activity
took place.").
36. See Sweitzer, supra note 34, at 1 (discussing Republican opposition to
worldwide taxation system).
37. See Engel, supra note 17, at 1539 (describing strong opposition to "out-
right elimination of deferral for foreign subsidiaries operating within economically
developed countries").
38. See OFFICE OF TAX POLICY, supra note 5, at 61 (discussing expanding rele-
vance of concerns compelling 1962 adoption of Subpart F regime); Engel, supra
note 17, at 1530 (discussing purpose of Subpart F to prevent U.S. taxpayers from
benefiting from foreign subsidiary deferrals); ABA Tax 2001 Top Simplifications: Sub-
part F, AM. BAR Ass'N (Feb. 2001), http://www.americanbar.org/groups/taxation/
policy/public-policy/14.html (noting original purpose of Subpart F regime as tax-
ation of passive and "readily moveable" income).
39. See DAVID L. BRUMBAUGH, CONG. RESEARCH SERv., RL 32125, TAx EXEMP-
TION FOR REPATRIATED FOREIGN EARNINGS: PROPOSALS AND ANALYSIs 2 (2006), avail-
able at http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RL32125_20060427.pdf (discussing
Subpart F disincentive from accumulating "tax-deferred income" from passive in-
vestments in tax haven subsidiaries); Engel, supra note 17, at 1541-42 (discussing
types of income that frequently comprise Subpart F income including "liquid pas-
sive investments").
40. See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 106TH CONG., OVERVIEW OF PRE-
SENT-LAw RULES AND ECONOMIC ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL TAXATION (Comm. Print
1999), available at http://wwwjct.gov/jct-html/x-13-99.htm (discussing anti-defer-
ral regimes in section entitled "Foreign operations conducted through a foreign
corporation"); OFFICE OF TAX POLICY, supra note 5, at 1.
839
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tion. Subpart F income that is earned by a CFC must be included in a U.S.
corporate shareholder's income, whether or not those earnings are repa-
triated-sent back-to the United States. 4 1 Subpart F income generally
includes only passive income;42 active income of foreign subsidiary busi-
ness operations is not Subpart F income, and that active income can be
continuously reinvested in the foreign country without being subject to
U.S. taxation.
Because of Subpart F's limited applicability, the U.S. tax system still
permits U.S. MNCs to permanently defer most types of income earned by
foreign subsidiaries. 43 U.S. multinationals can opt to defer domestic taxes
on profits earned by their CFCs until the profits are actually transferred to
the parent company, such as by dividend distributions." These rules al-
low a U.S. MNC to indefinitely defer U.S. taxation, creating a tax incentive
to keep foreign profits offshore.4 5
Although the tax effect of investing in a subsidiary instead of a branch
has changed over time, the taxation of foreign subsidiaries of U.S. corpo-
rations has always been, and continues to be, a glaring gap in the U.S.
system of international taxation. These permanent deferral mechanisms
have allowed U.S. MNCs to defer U.S. taxation on billions of dollars in
foreign-source, active-business income. 46
41. See Rodney P. Mock & Andreas Simon, Permanently Reinvested Earnings:
Priceless, 121 TAX NoTEs 835, 837-39 (2008) (discussing deferral and repatriation of
shareholder income in section entitled "deferring taxes, shifting profits, and pay-
ing less").
42. See id.
43. See SHAPIRO & MATHUR, supra note 9, at 9 (discussing use of deferral to
avoid U.S. tax on income that is not acquired though passive investments in finan-
cial instruments or other portfolio investments).
44. See First in Series on Tax Code Simplification: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Oversight and Subcomm. on Select Revenue Measures of the H. Comm. on Ways and Means,
107th Cong. 109-10 (2001) (statement of American Bankers Association) (noting
that where income is derived from active conduct deferral can be used), available
at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-107hhrg75055/pdf/CHRG-107hhrg750
55.pdf; SHAPIRO & MATHUR, supra note 9, at 9.
45. See SHAPIRO & MATHUR, supra note 9, at 9 (discussing deferral of tax on
CFC profits until returned to parent company as dividend); MARR & HIGHsMiTH,
supra note 6, at 2 (stating that dividend repatriation tax holiday "effectively allows
such firms to defer payment of the U.S. corporate income tax on their overseas
profits indefinitely, even though they may obtain an immediate tax deduction for
many expenses incurred in supporting the same overseas investments"); see also
Robert Carroll, The Importance of Tax Deferral and a Lower Corporate Tax Rate, SPECIAL
REPORT (Tax Found., Washington, D.C.), Feb. 2010, available at http://www.tax
foundation.org/files/srl74.pdf (discussing use of deferral by United States compa-
nies operating abroad).
46. See Mock & Simon, supra note 41, at 837-39 (discussing permanent defer-
ral in section entitled "deferring taxes, shifting profits, and paying less").
[Vol. 56: p. 833840
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III. REPATRIATION TAX HOLIDAYS
A. Introduction
There is no dispute that U.S. MNCs have hundreds of billions of dol-
lars trapped offshore as a result of U.S. tax policy;4 7 but there is little
agreement about what to do about it. Some commentators have called for
permanent elimination of the repatriation tax-which would allow U.S.
MNCs to earn unlimited dollars overseas in low-tax jurisdictions and re-
turn those funds to the United States without an additional U.S. tax bur-
den.4 8 The repatriation tax could be eliminated without otherwise
reforming the U.S. international tax system; or the U.S. system could be
reconstituted from the ground up as a territorial system.49 Others take a
position at the opposite extreme, advocating a pure worldwide system of
taxation-where U.S. MNCs are taxed on all their foreign income, regard-
less of whether the income is earned through a branch or a subsidiary.5 0
The most popular proposal is to enact a temporary repatriation tax
holiday that would offer U.S. corporations a severely reduced tax rate-
about five percent-on funds brought back into the United States from
overseas. Proponents of a repatriation holiday believe it will significantly
boost U.S. tax revenue and increase domestic hiring at a time of record
unemployment and a stagnating recovery.5 They claim that a repatria-
47. See RoLs EIcKE, TAX PLANNING WITH HOLDING COMPANIES-REPATRIATION
OF US PROFITS FROM EUROPE: CONCEPTS, STRATEGIES, STRUGrURES 17 (2009)
("[T]ax deferral is one of the most-popular tax planning techniques of US MNCs."
(quoting KIMBERLY A. CLAUSING & REUVEN S. Avi-YONAH, HAMILTON PROJEcr, RE-
FORMING CORPORATE TAXATION IN A GLOBAL ECONOMv. A PROPOSAL To ADOPT FOR-
MULARY APPORTIONMENT 6 (2007), available at http://www.brookings.edu/-/
media/Files/rc/papers/2007/06corporatetaxes-clausing/200706clausing
aviyonah.pdf)).
48. See Saj Karsan, Time to End the Repatriation Tax?, SEEKING ALPHA (Feb. 23,
2011), http://seekingalpha.com/article/254531-time-to-end-the-repatriation-tax
(explaining benefit of "relaxation of repatriation taxes").
49. See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 109TH CONG., OPTIONS TO IM-
PROVE TAX COMPLIANCE AND REFORM TAx EXPENDITURES 186-96 (Comm. Print
2005), available at http://wwwjct.gov/publications.html?func=startdown&id=1524
(discussing proposed change from present "deferral system" to "dividend exemp-
tion system" and effects on corporations' foreign-source income); PRESIDENT'S AD-
VISORY PANEL ON FED. TAx REFORM, SIMPLE, FAIR, & PRO-GROWTH: PROPOSALS TO
Fix AMERICA'S TAx SYSTEM 124-26 (2005), available at http://govinfo.library.unt.
edu/taxreformpanel/final-report/index.html (describing how panel's first plan,
entitled "Simplified Income Tax Plan," affects corporations). See generallyJ. Clifton
Fleming, Jr. et al., Worse than Exemption, 59 EMORY L.J. 79 (2009).
50. See Bob McIntyre & Steve Wamhoff, Congress Should End "Deferral" Rather
than Adopt a "Territorial" Tax System, REPORT (Citizens for Tax Justice, Washington,
D.C.), Mar. 23, 2011, available at http://www.ctj.org/pdf/internationalcorptax
2011.pdf (outlining how "pure worldwide system" is best option for reforming
America's corporate tax regime because it does not encourage corporations to
"shift jobs or profits abroad").
51. See BRUMBAUGH, supra note 39, at 1, 5 (discussing arguments for tempo-
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tion holiday would bring an additional $1 trillion back into the United
States.5 2 And the claim has been made that every billion dollars brought
into the United States will create 15,000 to 20,000jobs-for a total of 15 to
20 million newjobs.53 A previous repatriation holiday gives us the num-
bers to empirically test these claims.
B. The American Jobs Creation Act Repatriation Holiday
On October 22, 2004, Congress passed the American Jobs Creation
Act (or Act), which introduced a temporary repatriation tax holiday. 54
Under the law, U.S. corporations were permitted to deduct 85% of qualify-
ing cash dividends received from foreign subsidiaries. 5 With a top corpo-
rate income tax rate of 35%, corporations were effectively taxed at a 5.25%
rate on repatriated profits.5 6 The holiday lasted from October 22, 2004,
through October 22, 2006.57 Most companies that took advantage of the
holiday claimed the deduction for tax year 2005.58
1. The Domestic Reinvestment Requirement
As with the current push for a holiday, proponents of the 2004 holi-
day hoped it would boost the U.S. economy and motivate U.S. multina-
tionals to hire U.S. workers. To that end, the law provided for certain
restrictions on the use of repatriated funds to meet the program's goals.
52. See James Pethokoukis, Why We Need a Tax Holiday for Overseas Earnings,
REuTERs (June 20, 2011), http://blogs.reuters.com/james-pethokoukis/2011/06/
20/why-we-need-a-tax-holiday-for-overseas-eamings/ ("'In the short term, the mea-
sure could generate tens of billions in tax revenues as companies transfer money
that would otherwise remain abroad, and it could help ease the huge budget defi-
cit.'" (citation omitted)).
53. See David Kocieniewski, Companies Push for Tax Break on Foreign Cash, N.Y.
TIMES, June 20, 2011, at Al (quotingJim Rogers, chief of Duke Energy), available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/20/business/20tax.html?r=1 &pagewanted=
all. As of November 2011, there are about 13.3 million unemployed. See Employ-
ment Situation Summary, BURFAU OF LABOR STATISTIcs, http://www.bls.gov/news.re-
lease/archives/empsit_12022011.pdf (providing nationwide unemployment
information for November 2011).
54. See American Jobs Creation Act, H.R. 4520, 108th Cong. § 422 (2004)
(outlining temporary tax deduction for corporations' foreign-source income).
55. See id. (describing details of tax holiday); see also I.R.S. Notice 2005-10,
2005-1 C.B. 474, available at 2005 WL 66835 (setting forth details of domestic rein-
vestment plan).
56. See Fullenkamp, supra note 9 (discussing economic results from Act's pro-
visions calling for "85% dividends-received deduction" from corporations, "repatri-
ation of earnings at 5.25% for one year," and taxing highest corporate bracket).
57. See Mock & Simon, supra note 41, at 835 n.7 (describing length of tax
repatriation holiday).
58. See id. (noting that "[o]ut of the 81 firms ... tested ... , 13 repatriated in
their tax year 2006, 67 in 2005, and 1 in 2004").
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The law required corporations to reinvest repatriated funds according to
an approved domestic reinvestment plan.5 9
First, the amount of funds that could be repatriated under the holi-
day was restricted to the larger of (1) $500 million, (2) the amount of
"earnings permanently reinvested outside the United States," and (3)
where the company's financial statement does not show such an amount,
but does show an amount of tax liability attributable to earnings reinvested
outside the United States, that amount divided by 35%.60
Reinvestment plans were required to use the funds as "a source for
the funding of worker hiring and training, infrastructure, research and
development, capital investments, or the financial stabilization of the cor-
poration for the purposes of job retention or creation."6 1 Under Notice
2005-10, the first guidance issued by the IRS on the repatriation holiday,
"financial stabilization" included repayment of debt, qualified plan fund-
ing, and other investments. 62 Permitted investments also included some
acquisitions of interests in domestic or foreign business entities, advertis-
ing and marketing expenses, and expenditures to purchase or license
rights to intangible property.6 3
Although some of the allowed investments-e.g., research and invest-
ment-had the potential to immediately create jobs, many others, like
debt reduction and advertising and marketing, at best set the stage for
future job creation. Other investments, like acquisitions, could lead to
layoffs since acquired businesses are typically consolidated to reduce over-
head and other costs.
2. The Fungibility Problem
The American Jobs Creation Act included substantial restrictions on
uses of repatriated funds.64 So how did firms manage to use repatriated
funds for prohibited purposes like stock buy-backs and dividends? Money
is fungible. As Representative Doggett (D-TX) explained when talks about
a second repatriation holiday surfaced: "Money is fungible and efforts to
59. See I.R.S. Notice 2005-10, supra note 55, at 476 (describing general re-
quirements of "domestic reinvestment plan").
60. See I.R.S. Notice 2005-38, 2005-1 C.B. 1100, 1101, available at 2005 WL
1090135 (outlining maximum amount of corporate funds eligible for tax repatria-
tion holiday).
61. Id. at 1102.
62. See I.R.S. Notice 2005-10, supra note 55, at 478-79 (discussing expenditures
qualifying as "permitted investments" under tax holiday).
63. See id. at 479-80 (enumerating expenditures qualifying as permitted
expenses).
64. See American jobs Creation Act, H.R. 4520, 108th Cong. § 422 (2004) (es-
tablishing restrictions on "temporary dividends received reduction" in section enti-
tled "limitations"); McIntyre & Wamhoff, supra note 50, at 8 ("[Tlhe 2004
repatriation holiday legislation did technically 'require' that repatriated profits
had to be used 'for the funding of worker hiring and training, infrastructure, re-
search and development, capital investments, or the financial stabilization of the
corporation for the purposes of job retention or creation.'").
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tie repatriated funds to new investment and hiring failed. The evidence
shows that the corporate tax holiday was mainly used for stock repurchases
and dividends-uses expressly prohibited by the legislation."6 5 One dollar
is one dollar, regardless of whether it comes from retained earnings or a
repatriation tax break. As a result, corporations were able to sidestep the
conditions on the previous tax holiday. "Permitted investments" were too
broadly defined by the American Jobs Creation Act, with the result that
repatriated funds could be used to pay already planned expenses that fit
into the categories of permitted investments, and then cash that would
have been earmarked for those expenses could be used to pay executive
compensation or dividends or to buy-back stock.66 For instance, if, prior
to the repatriation holiday, a corporation had planned a $30 million ac-
quisition that qualified as a permitted investment under the Act, the cor-
poration could follow through on the acquisition claiming repatriated
funds were used to make the acquisition. Then, a $30 million dividend
could be paid to shareholders without running afoul of the conditions
imposed on the tax break. Tracing the arc of individuals' dollars is diffi-
cult if not impossible, especially for a multi-billion dollar MNC.
3. 2004 Repatriation Holiday Data
The 2004 repatriation holiday netted a 266% increase in repatriations
from 2004 to 2005.67 About 800 companies took advantage of the holiday,
bringing $320 billion in previously deferred income back into the United
States.6 8 About $17 billion of additional income tax revenue came into
the U.S. Treasury as a result-tax revenue that likely would have been
held overseas indefinitely but for the holiday.6 9
Despite the tax holiday's relative success at bringing profits back into
the United States, its effect on the investing behavior of corporations
65. See Rep. Lloyd Doggett on the Republican Corporate Tax Holiday Plan: To Repub-
licans, Deficits Only Matter When Asking Seniors and Students to Sacrifice, DOGGET
.HOUSE.Gov. (May 11, 2011), http://doggett.house.gov/index.php?option=com
content&view=article&id=258jctreport&catid=49:atest-news&Itemid=149 (discuss-
ing repatriation tax holiday failure to create jobs).
66. See Stewart Berger, Repatriated Dividends Encouraged Under the American jobs
Creation Act, 76 CPAJ. Jan. 2006, at 40, available at http://www.nysscpa.org/print
versions/cpaj/2006/106/p40.htm; see also I.R.C. § 965 (2011) (codifying repatria-
tion tax holiday).
67. See DONALD J. MARPLES & JANE G. GRAVELLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
R40178, TAX CUTS ON REPARATION EARNINGS AS ECONOMIC STIMULUS: AN ECONOMIC
ANALYSIs 4 (2011), available at www.ctj.org/pdf/crs-repatriationholiday.pdf (not-
ing 266% repatriation increase in year following American Jobs Creation Act, re-
sulting in "a large 'spike' in repatriations" compared to rest of decade).
68. See Grover Norquist, It's Time for Another Repatriation Holiday, DAILY CALLER,
(Mar. 7, 2011), http://dailycaller.com/2011/03/07/its-time-for-another-repatria-
tion-holiday/ (describing economic result of repatriation holiday).
69. See id. ("The money was used to fund pension plans, raise wages, create
jobs, and invest in new plants and equipment.").
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utilizing the holiday was minimal.70 Proponents of a second tax holiday
claim that a repatriation holiday will motivate U.S. corporations to boost
hiring in the United States, but the biggest beneficiaries of the 2004 tax
holiday reduced their domestic work force after taking the tax break-
reducing their aggregate workforce by more than 100,000 jobs in the two
years following repatriation. And jobs were not the only claimed benefit
that failed to materialize following repatriation. "[Rlepatriations under
the HIA are not associated with increased domestic investment, employ-
ment, or R&D activity . . . ."71
Repatriated funds clearly were not used to hire U.S. workers, so what
were they used for? Empirical studies found that repatriated earnings
were not used as Congress intended: to motivate domestic investment, em-
ployment, and R&D. Instead, sixty to ninety percent of all repatriated
funds were distributed to shareholders, mostly in the form of stock buy-
backs.72 Although the domestic reinvestment requirement on which the
tax break was premised forbade those uses, the fungibility of money (dis-
cussed previously) allowed corporations to circumvent those requirements
and shift repatriated capital to prohibited uses.
Dollars Repatriated Layoffs 2005-2006
Pfizer $37 billion 10,000
Merck $15.9 billion 7,000
Hewlett-Packard $14.5 billion 14,500
Honeywell $2.7 billion 2,000
Ford $900 million 30,000
Colgate-Palmolive $800 million 30,000
TOTAL $1.7701 billion 93,500
That MNCs repatriated capital but did not invest it in their domestic
operations suggests that access to internal capital was not a predominating
70. See AVIVA ARON-DINE, CTR. ON BUDGET AND POL'Y PRIORITIES, REPATRIA-
TION MEASURE UNLIKELY TO STIMULATE THE U.S. ECONOMY OR BOOST INVESTMENT-
BuT WILL PROMOTE INVESTMENT IN TAx HAVENS AND UNDERMINE THE CORPORATE
INCOME TAx 1 (2008), available at http://www.cbpp.org/files/1-30-08tax.pdf (not-
ing repatriation measures generally suffer "the same basic problem that plagues
most other business tax breaks offered as stimulus measures: it would infuse cash
into large, profitable corporations unlikely to spend it quickly, and so would have
little effect in stimulating the economy in the near term").
71. Dhammika Dharmapala et al., Watch What IDo, Not What I Say: The Unin-
tended Consequences of the Homeland Investment Act, 66 J. OF FIN. 753, 775 (2011).
72. See id. at 755 ("[E]very dollar of repatriated cash was associated with an
increase of $0.60-$0.92 in payouts to shareholders, largely in the form of share
repurchases."). See generally Roy Clemons & Michael R. Kinney, An Analysis of the
Tax Holiday for Repatriations Under the Jobs Act, 120 TAx NOTEs 759 (2008) (examin-
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factor in their unwillingness to increase their domestic operations. As a
result, if tax policy hopes to satisfy the objective of increasing domestic
investment by U.S. MNCs, forces motivating desirable reinvestment behav-
ior must be ascertained.
4. Failing of the First Holiday-Internal Rate of Return
The American Jobs Creation Act failed to live up to its name because
it motivated repatriation of offshore funds without constraining the use of
repatriated funds to domestic investment or job creation.73 Congress
hoped to force domestic investment of repatriated funds by imposing a
domestic reinvestment requirement on the holiday, but it failed to recog-
nize that the fungibility of money eliminated the efficacy of those require-
ments. The expansive universe of possible domestic reinvestment plans
gave MNCs enough space to maneuver around the requirements and
wholly circumvent the restrictions.
The conditions did not achieve their stated purpose because they did
not change the economics of domestic reinvestment or hiring for compa-
nies taking advantage of the tax break; they only encouraged repatriation.
Generally, U.S. MNCs have access to capital (e.g., through loans), so an
infusion of capital alone does not necessarily motivate domestic invest-
ment or incentivize hiring. If domestic investment were economically
more advantageous than overseas investments, presumably those MNC
would have invested domestically with or without the tax incentive.
Corporations generally attribute a cost of capital to internal capital, in
the same way they do with borrowed capital. And, as with borrowed capi-
tal, if the rate of return on investment of internal capital does not exceed
the cost of capital, the corporation generally will not make the investment.
Although a repatriation holiday does not change the rate of return on
domestic investment, it does significantly reduce the cost of bringing capi-
tal back into the United States from overseas. The result is that capital is
repatriated, but because domestic investment is not economically desira-
ble, repatriated capital is put to other uses.
Analysis of data from the prior repatriation tax holiday suggests that
the default choice for use of excess domestic capital is to use the funds to
keep shareholders happy in a tough economic environment. As a result,
MNCs that repatriate offshore capital under the reinvestment program are
well-positioned to funnel cash to their return savers-i.e., stock and bond
holders. The siphoning of repatriated cash to stockholders results in a
windfall to shareholders since the tax cost of repatriating offshore funds is
already built into share price.
If Congress moves forward on another repatriation holiday, it must
clearly define its purpose. According to Cisco CEO and Chairma John
Chambers, another repatriation holiday would "put more than two million
73. See MAlut & HIGHSMITH, supra note 6, at 3 (suggesting American Jobs Crea-
tion Act primarily benefited corporate owners and shareholders).
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Americans back to work at no cost to the government or American taxpay-
ers."74 But if jobs growth is the political rationale for the holiday, Con-
gress needs to recognize the tax break for what it is: a subsidy. And it is
necessary to explicitly identify who we are subsidizing: U.S. shareholders
or U.S. workers. Trust the words of corporate leaders like John Chambers,
but verify that jobs are created as a consequence of the subsidy.
The conditions put on the 2004 holiday left very few strings attached
to repatriated funds, leaving MNCs free to spend the funds as they saw fit.
Any future subsidy must tie the tax break to jobs creation in a meaningful
way. To motivate domestic investment, it must incentivize domestic hiring
by positioning the break as a jobs subsidy. The 2004 domestic reinvest-
ment requirement was a nod toward jobs growth, but the program had no
teeth.
C. A Model for Repatriation: The EB-5 Visa Program
1. Introduction
The American Jobs Creation Act repatriation holiday had the stated
policy objective of boosting the U.S. economy and increasing domestic
employment. But the tax break failed to fulfill those objectives when the
tax break was typically funneled to shareholders through stock buy-backs
and dividends. If the objective of a repatriation holiday is to directly subsi-
dize the creation of U.S. jobs, we need to look further afield for an analo-
gous program. The American Jobs Creation Act went through the
motions of requiring U.S. MNCs to reinvest repatriated funds and create
jobs, but the program failed to ensure that investments were made in new
projects. If the objective of any new repatriation program is to directly
subsidize investment in U.S. jobs, Congress should look to an analogous
program-the EB-5 Immigrant Investor Program-for a blueprint that re-
quires job creation and includes mechanisms to ensure that created jobs
are new jobs that would not have been created but for program
investments.
The EB-5 visa program is an immigration initiative that was created to
"stimulate the U.S. economy through job creation and capital investment
by foreign investors."75 It conditions fast-track U.S. immigration on invest-
ment in the United States, and includes a definably high standard for satis-
fying the program's jobs creation requirements. If immigrant investors
can be held to this high standard, why not apply similarly rigorous require-
ments to MNCs who take advantage of a future repatriation holiday?
74. John Chambers & Safra Catz, The Overseas Profits Elephant in the Room,
WALL ST. J., Oct. 20, 2010, at A19, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SBOO
01424052748704469004575533880328930598.html.
75. EB-5 Immigrant Investor, U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVS., http://
www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/menuitem.ebld4c2a3e5b9ac89243c6a7543fbd
la/?vgnextoid=facb83453d4a321OVgnVCMlOOOOOb92ca6OaRCRD&vgnextchannel
=facb83453d4a321OVgnVCM100000b92ca6OaRCRD (last updated Dec. 6, 2011).
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2. EB-5 Participation Requirements
Unlike the American Jobs Creation Act, which conditioned the 2004
repatriation program on vague, overbroad domestic investment require-
ments that were easily circumvented, the EB-5 program has specific crite-
ria that EB-5 investors must satisfy to receive permanent residency status.
To qualify for a green card under the EB-5 program, foreign nationals
must invest a threshold amount of capital in the United States and create
at least ten jobs.76 In general, $1 million must be invested in the United
States to qualify for the program, but the threshold is reduced to $500,000
if the foreign national invests in "certain qualified investments or regional
centers with high unemployment rates."77
EB-5 investors must invest in a "new commercial enterprise," which is
a for-profit commercial enterprise:
- Established after Nov. 29, 1990, or
- Established on or before Nov. 29, 1990, that is:
1. Purchased and the existing business is restructured or reorga-
nized in such a way that a new commercial enterprise results, or
2. Expanded through the investment so that a 40-percent in-
crease in the net worth or number of employees occurs.7 8
The enterprise must "create or preserve" ten or more full-time jobs
for "qualifying United States workers."79 The jobs-creation requirement
must be satisfied within two years of the immigrant's entry into the United
States as a "Conditional Permanent Resident." 0 Jobs created as a result of
an EB-5 investment must last until the immigrant investor's conditions are
removed and they are granted an unconditional green card. 1
76. See Departments of State, Justice, and Commerce, the Judiciary and Re-
lated Agencies Appropriations Act, § 610, Pub. L. No. 102-395, 106 Stat. 1828
(1992) (establishing visa pilot program); Immigrant Investor Pilot Program, 59
Fed. Reg. 17920, 17920-21 (April 15, 1994) (codified at 8 C.F.R. §§ 103, 204
(2011)) (outlining program requirements); 9 FAM § 42.32(e) (2011) (setting
forth relevant provisions for employment-based immigration visa program (citing
Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b) (5) (2006))).
77. Andrew Frascone, The EB-5 Visa, EON-EB5 ELITE GRP. (Apr. 10, 2010),
http://eon-eb5.com/?cat=6.
78. SeeEB-5 Immigrant Investor, supra note 75 (citing examples of commercial
enterprises, including sole proprietorships, partnerships, holding companies, joint
ventures, corporations, business trusts, or other entities).
79. See id. (explaining that wholly owned subsidiaries of holding companies
engaged in for-profit activity are included in definition of commercial enterprise).
80. See id. (indicating jobs qualifying for program)
81. See 8 C.F.R. § 204.6 (2011) (describing qualifying employees as those who
work a minimum of thirty-five hours per week and allowing for job-share agree-
ments to fulfill this requirement); see also Green Card, CHICAGOLAND FOREIGN INV.
GROUP, LLC, http://www.chicagoeb5.com/?page_id=52#3 (last visited Aug. 7,
2011) (discussing difference between conditional and unconditional green cards).
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3. Documenting Compliance with EB-5 Program Requirements
Unlike the 2004 repatriation program, the EB-5 visa program has very
specific requirements for use of invested funds and rigorous verification
procedures.8 2 The immigrant investor must provide substantial documen-
tation-sometimes approaching 2,000 pages in length-to immigration
authorities both prior to and after being approved for the program. 83
First, to receive approval for participation in the EB-5 program, appli-
cants include a detailed business plan with their petition for participation
in the program.84 The business plan must include detailed economic
analyses showing specifically how the immigrant investor's initial invest-
ment will create at least ten U.S. jobs.8 5
After their petition is approved, the immigrant investor is given a two-
year conditional green card.86 To have the conditions removed from their
green card after two years, the immigrant must provide substantial docu-
mentation of his or her compliance with program requirements, including
the jobs creation requirement.8 7 "The capital investment must be fully
infused into the job creating enterprise most closely responsible for the
capital investment activities that will create the jobs."8 8 To successfully
complete the program and have restrictions removed from a green card,
the program participant must provide documentation demonstrating that
82. See generally 8 C.F.R. § 204.6 (requiring foreign business registration
records, tax records, and comprehensive business plans, among other forms of
verification).
83. See generally id. (outlining requirement for continued program
participation).
84. See 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b) (5) (2006 & Supp. IV 2010); 8 C.F.R.§204 .6(j) (4) (i) (B) (2011) (requiring submission of comprehensive business
plan); see also U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC.,
OMB No. 1615-0026, INSTRUCTIONS FOR FORM 1-526: IMMIGRANT PETITION BY ALIEN
ENTREPRENEUR 2 (2010) [hereinafter FORM 1-526 INSTRUCTIONs], available at http:/
/www.uscis.gov/files/form/i-526instr.pdf (mandating submission of certain evi-
dence as part of petition).
85. See 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b) (5) (determining compliance under§203(b)(5)(A)(iii) of the Immigration and Nationality Act); 8 C.F.R.§ 204.6(j) (4) (i) (B) (providing required showings to be included in mandated bus-
iness plan); see also FORM 1-526 INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 84, at 2 (indicating re-
quirements of minimum investment and job creation for participation in visa
program).
86. See 8 U.S.C. § 1186b(a)-(b) (presenting procedural steps involved in con-
ditional green card receipt); Green Card, supra note 81 (outlining difference be-
tween conditional and unconditional green cards).
87. See 8 U.S.C. § 1186b(d) (1) (requiring proof that, among other things,
alien invested or is in process of investing requisite capital); Immigration Procedure,
CHICAGOLAND FOREIGN INv. GRP, LLC, http://www.chicagoeb5.com/?page-id=33
(last visited Aug. 7, 2011) (providing chart explaining documentation and proce-
dures for obtaining green card).
88. U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS: USCIS
QUARTERLY EB-5 STAKEHOLDERS MEETING 3 (June 30, 2011), available at http://eb-5
center.com/files/EB-5%20June%202011%2OStakeholder%2OMeeting%20QA.pdf.
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the jobs were indeed created.8 9 Evidence of the number of full-time em-
ployees created by the investment includes the following: (1) payroll
records; (2) relevant tax documents; and (3) Form I-9s.9o Records from
both the time the investment was made and the end of the two-year term
must be submitted to verify that the requisite number of jobs was created
during the two-year period. 9 1
The EB-5 program demands concrete data demonstrating that an ap-
plicant's investment has created the required number of jobs.9 2 By tight-
ening its requirements, the program ensures that the program satisfies the
policy objectives for which it was formed. If, as trumpeted by supporters in
Washington and industry, the primary purpose for passing a new repatria-
tion tax break is to create U.S. jobs, MNCs should be held to standards at
least as rigorous as those applied to immigrant investors seeking residency
in the United States.
D. Solving the Trapped Earnings Puzzle
1. Introduction
Rather than solve the trapped earnings problem through a wholesale
rewriting of Subpart F, I propose a simpler solution borrowing from the
American Jobs Creation Act repatriation holiday. But this solution cannot
be a simple rehashing of the previous holiday, which, as illustrated above,
failed to achieve its stated objectives because it failed to recognize the fun-
gibility of money and the impossibility of enforcing that program's broad
domestic reinvestment requirements.
First, any new repatriation holiday must have more discretely defined
objectives-i.e., a subsidy of MNC balance sheets, MNC shareholders, or
simply domestic employment. Jobs creation is preferable because it is an
easily verifiable and administrable benchmark, unlike a broadly defined
domestic reinvestment requirement. The holiday also must include "trust
through verification" mechanics and reporting requirements to verify that
its objectives are satisfied. And where an MNC fails to reinvest repatriated
funds as required, a mechanism for clawing back tax savings must be im-
plemented to put the company back in the tax position it would have been
in had it never repatriated the funds. These rigorous verification require-
89. See 8 C.F.R. § 204.6 (j) (4) (iii), (m) (7) (ii) (requiring showing that invest-
ment will create, directly or indirectly, ten jobs and allowing "reasonable method-
ologies" to show jobs were created indirectly, including "multiplier tables,
feasibility studies, analyses of foreign and domestic markets ... ,and other fore-
casting devices").
90. See § 204.6(j) (4) (i) (A) (approving certain documents to demonstrate job
creation requirements).
91. See § 204.6(j) (4) (establishing the initial evidence an EB-5 applicant must
submit with an EB-5 petition); § 216.6 (establishing the procedure an EB-5 inves-
tor must follow to remove the conditional basis of his or her green card after the
two-year ).
92. See § 204.6(j) (4) (i) (A)-(B) (calling for comprehensive business plan, tax
documents, payroll information).
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ments will level the playing field for labor investments and allow American
labor to compete with other labor markets for U.S. capital. And not only
is jobs creation desirable and verifiable, it also results in multiple tax reve-
nue streams to the United States. Repatriated funds are subject to U.S.
income tax, a second source of tax revenue-albeit at a significantly re-
duced rate-and individuals employed as a result of the investment of re-
patriated funds will pay income tax on their wages.
Second, any normative solution to the problems of repatriation must
change the internal rate of return for domestic investments. Rather than
just reducing the cost of repatriating foreign earnings into the United
States, the program must incentivize-or subsidize-domestic investment,
making domestic investment of repatriated funds an economic imperative
for participating corporations.
I recommend looking to the EB-5 Immigrant Investor Program for an
example of a targeted investment program that works, while satisfying the
requirements outlined above.
2. Verfication Procedure
The repatriation program cannot rely on simple self-reporting of the
use of repatriated funds to verify compliance with program requirements.
Participants should document their compliance with the terms of the pro-
gram and show how they have created the requisite number ofjobs under
the program.9 3
Unlike the broad domestic reinvestment criteria of the first repatria-
tion holiday, jobs creation can be specifically verified. The threshold num-
ber of U.S. jobs at a corporation participating in the tax holiday must be
established at the time the company makes a tax-discounted repatriation.
Then, at the close of the reporting period-whether two years or other-
wise-a second assessment must be made to ascertain whether jobs have
been created at the corporation. There is a ready mechanism for calculat-
ing jobs at large MNCs. Large corporations must electronically report
their payroll tax liability. Those records can be used to verify that jobs
have indeed been created at the company.
3. Clawback94
There are two options for recapturing deductions or credits from cor-
porations that fail to utilize the repatriation holiday or fail to satisfy jobs
93. See EB-5 Immigrant Investor, supra note 75 (noting spouses, sons, daughters,
and foreign nationals not authorized to work in United States are not qualifying
employees).
94. For general information on clawback policies under the Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, see Deborah Lifshey, Summary of
Clawback Policies Under Dodd-Frank Reform Act, BOARDMEMBER.COM, http://www.
boardmember.com/summary-of-clawback-policies-under-dodd-frank-reform-act.
aspx (last visited Jan. 19, 2012) (suggesting Dodd-Frank Act expanded mandatory
recoupment policies by precluding exemptions granted by SEC and national
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creation requirements: total clawback or pro rata clawback. Under total
clawback, a corporation that fails to satisfy the repatriation holiday's jobs
creation requirement must repay the repatriation deduction or credit in
full if the company fails to create the requisite number of jobs-even if
they miss the mark by only one job.
A less severe clawback option would require participants to pay back
only a pro rata portion of the deduction or credit. Each job would be
assigned a pro rata portion of the credit. For example, if the repatriation
program calls for ten jobs to be created for every $1 million repatriated
under the program, then an MNC that repatriates $100 million under the
program must create 1,000 jobs to satisfy program requirements. If the
company creates only 500 jobs, it will be forced to repay the tax break on
$50 million of the repatriated amount.
4. Clawback Amount
After determining how much of the credit will be clawed back if an
MNC fails to meet program requirements, Congress will need to wrestle
with the penalty and interest consequences of repatriation default. With-
out interest and penalty provisions, MNCs could be motivated to sign up
for the repatriation program for tax deferral purposes without ever in-
tending to create U.S. jobs. For instance, if an MNC repatriates $100 mil-
lion but fails to create the mandatory 1,000 jobs after a two-year period,
the MNC will be required to repay the deduction or credit allowed on the
repatriation. If the MNC paid only $5 million in income tax on the repa-
triated amount, but would have paid $35 million but for the holiday, the
MNC will repay $30 million to the federal government. In that situation,
the MNC has essentially taken a $30 million interest-free loan from the
federal government. The company had the benefit of $30 million for two
years, earning a return on that amount during that time.
The first component of the recapture is an interest component. If the
MNC, of the previous example, defaults on its repatriation program re-
quirements, it will be required to pay interest on the deferred amount. If
the rate charged to a company that fails to satisfy repatriation program
requirements is, for example, six percent, the MNC will be required to
repay the $30 million plus about $4 million in interest if it fails to create
the requisite number of jobs.
But the interest component will not ensure good-faith participation in
the program. In a low-interest rate environment, MNCs may find opportu-
nities that produce profits exceeding the underpayment interest rate. So,
if an MNC believes it can generate $5 million in additional revenue each
year by investing repatriated funds overseas, knowing it will only pay about
$4 million in interest on the deferred amount, the MNC generally will
participate in the program without ever intending to create U.S. jobs.
securities exchanges, requiring clawbacks regardless of executive wrongdoing, and
imposing penalties for non-compliance).
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Because of the potential for abuse, the repatriation program will need
to include penalties in addition to interest charges on the holiday tax
savings.
5. Clawback Mechanics
There are two distinct options for clawing back tax savings from
MNCs that fail to create the requisite number of jobs following repatria-
tion. The first option is to require a defaulting MNC to amend its income
tax return for the year when it took the repatriation tax break, using the
ordinary dividend rate (35%) instead of the holiday's reduced dividend
rate (5.25% under the 2004 holiday).9 5 Both the IRS and large corpora-
tions already have mechanisms in place to amend their past years' re-
turns-for instance, when carrying back net operating losses-so
implementing this version of the clawback will not create an undue bur-
den on either side.
Another option for recapturing repatriation tax savings is to require
the MNC to include the dividend income that was effectively exempted
from taxation under the holiday in the current year's income-the year
when the MNC fails to satisfy its job creation obligation. A variation on
the second variety of clawback would be to reverse the tax savings under
the repatriation by including the tax savings amount in income on the
MNC's tax return as an addition to tax in the year the MNC fails to satisfy
program requirements.
This clawback mechanism is akin to the first-time homebuyer
clawback applicable to individuals who take the first time homebuyer
credit but move out of the home within three years of the purchase.
Those taxpayers are required to repay the full amount of the credit (about
$8,000) in the year that they move out of the home. As with the first-time
homebuyer credit, clawback of the repatriation deduction can be accom-
plished by adding a single line to the taxpayer's tax return, where the re-
patriation deduction is added back into the corporation's gross income in
the year the MNC fails to satisfy the requirements of the repatriation
program.
Interest and penalties would be applied to the recaptured amount
regardless of the clawback mechanism used to remove any incentive to
participate in the program in bad faith.
IV. CONCLUSION
As recovery from the worst recession since the Great Depression fal-
ters, corporate leaders and congressmen are calling for a repeat of the
2004 American Jobs Creation Act repatriation tax holiday. They claim that
if U.S. MNCs are allowed to repatriate offshore earnings at a low tax cost,
95. See Fullenkamp, supra note 9 (outlining recourse suggested by American
Jobs Creation Act of 2004).
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the companies will reinvest the funds in the United States and increase
their domestic workforce.
To ensure domestic reinvestment of repatriated earnings, advocates
of a second holiday propose attaching a domestic reinvestment require-
ment to the tax break-as was done with the first holiday. But the rein-
vestment requirements of the first holiday were precatory at best. As we
saw with the 2004 holiday, jobs creation-and economic revitalization in
general-are not a foregone conclusion of repatriation.
Without a substantial domestic reinvestment requirement, a repatria-
tion holiday does nothing to boost domestic investment by U.S. MNCs.
On its own, a repatriation holiday only encourages repatriation of offshore
revenue into the United States; it does not encourage domestic reinvest-
ment or jobs creation. The reason that repatriation does not work as in-
tended is that repatriation alone does not change the economics of
domestic investment. As a result, U.S. MNCs respond to the tax holiday by
repatriating foreign income. But once the revenue is here, domestic in-
vestment is no more attractive than it was prior to the holiday, and the
corporations put the funds to other uses. In tough economic times, the
logical choice for excess funds is to funnel them to shareholders-and
that is exactly what MNCs did during the 2004 holiday. The repatriation
holiday then disproportionately benefits shareholders. And because the
tax cost of repatriating offshore earnings has already been discounted into
their share price, the shareholder payout is an undue windfall.
If domestic reinvestment and jobs creation are its goal, a repatriation
holiday will be effective only if criteria for participation in the holiday are
verifiable and easily administrable. Requiring domestic reinvestment in
the last holiday proved to be only a meaningless exercise, because the fun-
gibility of money allowed MNCs to divert repatriated earnings to their
shareholders. To satisfy its policy objectives, a repatriation holiday must
be recognized as what it is: a corporate subsidy. Being a subsidy, we must
craft tax policy with a clear idea of which corporate stakeholders we are
trying to subsidize-shareholders or U.S. employees.
Instead of using an amorphous domestic reinvestment requirement,
any new tax holiday should not just encourage repatriation of tax-deferred
earnings from multinationals' CFCs, but also place more specific condi-
tions on spending the repatriated funds necessary to garner the tax bene-
fit. Generalized domestic reinvestment requirements will do nothing to
encourage investment in the United States. Instead, the program should
use employment numbers to ensure that repatriated funds are used for
domestic reinvestment.
Employment is an easily verifiable and administrable measurement
tool. Domestic employment at an MNC both at the time of repatriation
and then at the close of the investment period is easily verifiable, provid-
ing a ready criterion for compliance with the domestic reinvestment re-
quirement for the repatriation tax break. In addition to being easily
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verifiable, using jobs as a measuring stick for domestic reinvestment lowers
the cost of the repatriation to the U.S. government. Not only will the
MNC pay income tax on the repatriated funds at the reduced repatriation
rate (e.g., 5.25%), employees hired using repatriated funds will pay in-
come tax on their wages at ordinary income rates.
A second repatriation holiday would be an effective, straightforward
way to encourage U.S. investment by MNCs and reduce domestic unem-
ployment. And a holiday would have the secondary effect of increasing
tax revenue, as a result of both the tax on repatriated earnings that would
not have been taxed but for the holiday, and the income and employment
taxes levied on employees added as a result of the subsidy.
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